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CONSCIOUSNESS OF ONESELF AS SUBJECT 
Quassim Cassam 
Béatrice Longuenesse opens her brilliant and illuminating account of Kant’s conception of self-
consciousness with the following statement: 
Kant was especially interested in a specific kind of self-consciousness, the kind that 
finds conceptual formulation in the proposition ‘I think’. In thinking ‘I think’, he 
claimed, we give conceptual expression to our consciousness of being engaged in a 
mental activity we take to be our own: the activity of combining and comparing 
representations according to logical rules…. Now, in being conscious of ourselves in 
this way, Kant claimed, we are not conscious of ourselves as an object among other 
objects in the world. I may, on other grounds, be conscious of myself as an object, 
indeed as a physical object, a particular entity among other entities located in space and 
time. But…. the consciousness I have of myself, as the subject of thinking (the 
consciousness I have of myself in being conscious that I think), is not a consciousness 
of myself as any kind of object at all, whether material or immaterial (2017: 1). 
Here we see some of the main elements of the view of consciousness of oneself as subject that 
Longuenesse attributes to Kant. There is the idea that consciousness of oneself as subject, as 
expressed in the proposition ‘I think’, consists in consciousness of being engaged in a mental 
activity. Call this the consciousness of mental activity thesis, or COMA for short. Then there 
is the idea that understood in this way, consciousness of oneself as the subject of thinking is 
not consciousness of oneself as any kind of object, material or immaterial. For Longuenesse’s 
Kant, consciousness of oneself as subject and as object are distinct. Call this the distinctness 
thesis. However, the point of this thesis is not to deny that each of us can be aware of himself 
or herself as a physical object, or to suggest that consciousness of oneself as a thinking subject 
and as a physical object are unconnected. For Longuenesse consciousness of oneself as 
thinking is ‘as a matter of empirical fact rather than as a matter of a priori argument, intimately 
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connected to awareness of one’s own body’ (2017: 234). Call this the connection thesis. I want 
to raise some questions about each of the theses I have extracted from Longuenesse’s opening 
statement.  
Starting with COMA, what is the nature of the mental activity that is at issue here and 
what is the nature of our awareness of it? The activity is binding and the consciousness that is 
at issue is ‘a consciousness of being engaged in an activity of binding one’s representations in 
such a way as to come up with concepts, combined in judgments, connected in inferential 
patterns’ (2017: 4). ‘Binding’, or ‘binding for thinking’ (2017: 29), is Longuenesse’s gloss on 
what Kant calls ‘synthesizing’ or ‘combining’. She suggests, plausibly, that Kant’s theory of 
synthesis ‘bears an interesting relation to the contemporary “binding” problem in cognitive 
psychology’ (2017: 14 note 5). However, there are some important differences between binding 
in the psychological sense and Kantian synthesis, and these differences raise questions about 
COMA. As John Campbell notes, ‘there is much converging evidence that different properties 
of an object, such as colour, shape, motion, size, or orientation are processed in different 
processing streams (2002: 30). This means that the brain has the problem of ‘reassembling 
individual objects’ from this information, and ‘we do not have perception of an individual 
object until this Binding Problem has been solved, and various simple sensory properties have 
been put together as properties of a single object’ (Campbell 2002: 30-31). Understood in this 
way, however, the binding problem is a problem for the brain rather than for the perceiving 
subject. People aren’t normally conscious of the process or processes by means of which 
individual objects are reassembled by their brains, and it is an empirical question how their 
brains operate. There are many different hypotheses about how the brain solves the binding 
problem, and it is for empirical science rather than armchair philosophy to determine how the 
problem is actually solved.  
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If the binding to which Longuenesse refers is the binding described by cognitive 
psychologists then the idea that we are conscious of the activity of binding our representations 
is problematic in at least two different ways: there is no such activity and no such 
consciousness. Binding is a sub-personal process or mechanism rather than a mental activity, 
something that a person or subject of experience does, and there is in the normal course of 
events no consciousness of this process. Why should it be supposed that armchair philosophical 
reflection is able to tell us very much about the nature of this activity?  Perhaps, in that case, it 
would be more charitable to interpret Longuenesse as suggesting not that her ‘binding for 
thinking’ is what cognitive psychologists ‘binding’ but only analogous to it. On this reading, 
Kantian binding is a genuine mental activity that is distinct from binding in the psychological 
sense. But then one might wonder what justification there is for positing two such processes 
working in parallel, one consciously and the other sub-personally. And if there are two such 
processes or activities, how exactly are they related? 
At various points in her discussion, Longuenesse attributes to Kant the view that the 
consciousness that is at issue in COMA and thinking more generally is perceptual: ‘For Kant, 
perceiving that I think is being affected by my own (active) thinking, just as I can be affected 
by external objects’ (2017: 86). Whether or not there is consciousness of binding there is such 
a thing as being aware of one’s own active thinking. What is more doubtful is whether it is 
right to regard such awareness as perceptual. On the face of it, one’s awareness of one’s own 
actions, including one’s mental actions, is nothing like one’s perceptual awareness of external 
objects, and this has led some to characterise action awareness as non-observational rather than 
observational. Indeed, Longuenesse herself quotes a passage from Kant in which he appears to 
describe a form of ‘pure action-awareness’, that is, ‘a consciousness of being engaged in the 
act of thinking (and synthesizing: transcendental imagination) just in virtue of being engaged 
in that act’ (2017: 86). This non-perceptual consciousness is different from the experience or 
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determinate perception of ‘the temporal succession of my mental states’ (2017: 2017). But 
perceptual awareness of the succession of one’s own mental states, even if there is such a thing, 
would not amount to perceiving that I think because the occurrence of a succession of mental 
states does not constitute thinking and is distinct from the supposed activity of combining and 
comparing representations according to logical rules.  
As it turns out, however, these questions about the extent to which our consciousness 
of binding our representations is perceptual are largely beside the point because it turns out that 
Longuenesse herself regards consciousness of the act of binding as ‘mostly implicit’ (2017: 
81). She argues that there is neither phenomenal nor intentional consciousness of our activity 
of binding representations, and that ‘we are conscious of the binding activity mostly through 
its results’ (2017: 181). More generally, ‘it is true for Kant that we become conscious of the 
mental activities that have gone into our cognitive achievements by being conscious of their 
results, by being conscious of those achievements themselves’ (2017: 191). The most striking 
result of the activity of binding is consciousness of objects of perception as abiding, as capable 
of continuing to exist unperceived. This is the cognitive achievement our consciousness of 
which implies consciousness of the binding that went into it. 
If this is what Longuenesse intends then several questions now arise. First, what is the 
sense in which we become conscious of mental activities by being conscious of their results? 
Consider this simple analogy: a complex range of culinary activities went into the preparation 
of the dish on my dinner plate but I’m not conscious of these activities by being conscious of 
their result – the dish. If I am an experienced cook I might be able to tell, on tasting the dish, 
how it was made but even in this scenario my knowledge of how the dish was made is strictly 
inferential; I am not conscious, not even implicitly, of the culinary activities that resulted in the 
dish in front of me. The perceptual case is even clearer: not only am I not implicitly conscious 
of the binding activities that are or were responsible for my perceptual consciousness of abiding 
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objects, perception of objects reveals little or nothing about how it came about. The idea that 
perception of objects presupposes binding is a sophisticated empirical hypothesis based on a 
range of background assumptions about the nature of perception. The positing of specific 
binding parameters can only be justified by reference to empirical psychology. Longuenesse is 
therefore right to insist that Kant’s transcendental psychology is ‘not unrelated to more 
empirical forays into the workings of the mind’ (2017: 175). Whether these empirical forays 
support Kant’s detailed story seems doubtful and in any event can’t be settled without a more 
detailed investigation than is possible here. However, the key point for present purposes is this: 
if there is no consciousness of the mental activity of binding then the ‘I think’ cannot give 
conceptual expression to this consciousness. A different account of the role of ‘I think’ is 
needed. 
Longuenesse has a great deal to say about the ‘I think’. Imagine judging that the object 
visible in the far distance is a tree and being asked whether one is sure of that. One response 
might be ‘Yes, I think that is a tree’. For Longuenesse, the ‘I’ in this response refers to the 
thinker of the current thought while the predicate ‘think this is a tree’ ‘is a concept that refers 
to the activity of reviewing reasons for asserting this is a tree’ (2017: 27). It’s not clear that this 
is right. For a start, although the question ‘are you sure?’ might lead one to review the reasons 
for judging that the object is a tree, ‘I think that’s a tree’ sounds like a hesitant statement of the 
conclusion of one’s reasoning rather than a reference to the reasoning itself. Leaving that aside, 
Longuenesse goes on to remark that ‘think this is a tree’ is asserted of oneself  ‘partly on the 
basis of information concerning one’s location and one’s physical properties’ and that in this 
case ‘being embodied and located becomes part of the concept one has of oneself’ (2017: 27). 
However, she argues, ‘this does not mean that a conception of oneself as spatially located and 




How can that be? How being embodied and located be part of one’s self-concept when 
self-ascribing the predicate ‘think this is a tree’ but the conception of oneself as located and 
embodied not be a condition for the use of “I”? To make her point Longuenesse uses a different 
example, the example of painstakingly going through a proof and concluding ‘I think the proof 
is valid’. Here the use of ‘I’ is ‘supported ‘not by my consciousness of my body, but by my 
consciousness of checking the steps and demonstrating the validity of the proof’ (2017: 28). 
Consciousness of oneself as a physical object doesn’t come into it. When I think ‘I think the 
proof is valid’ I am conscious of myself ‘as a thinker’ and ‘need not be conscious of myself in 
any other capacity’ (2017: 184). Consciousness of myself as thinking subject and as an object 
are, in this sense, quite distinct, and this is the point of the distinctness thesis. Indeed, for 
Longuenesse, not only is consciousness of oneself as a thinker distinct from consciousness of 
oneself as an embodied entity; it is also independently intelligible and so doesn’t require the 
consciousness of oneself as such an entity.   
Even if Longuenesse is right about ‘I think the proof is valid’, it doesn’t follow that the 
‘I’ in ‘I think that’s a tree’ doesn’t need to be conceived of as spatially located and embodied. 
The two cases are, on the face of it quite different. Reflection on the validity of a proof is a 
piece of abstract thinking about an “object” to which one need not be perceptually related. The 
proof can be written down on a piece of paper but needn’t be. In contrast, reflection on whether 
a perceptually presented object is a tree is, by definition, reflection on an object to which one 
is perceptually related. In thinking ‘I think this is a tree’ one has a specific tree in mind. If the 
tree in question is one that one can perceive then the ‘this’ in ‘I think this is a tree’ is functioning 
as a perceptual demonstrative. In visual perception objects are (at least normally) presented as 
spatially related to the subject, who is thereby also presented to himself or herself as spatially 
locate. In tactile perception one is also presented to oneself as embodied. However, the self that 
perceives the tree is the self that is thinking about the tree, and is conscious of doing so. If one 
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is aware of the perceiving self as located and embodied then one is, to that extent, aware of the 
thinking self as located and embodied.  They are manifestly the same self. However, the self 
that thinks ‘This is a tree’ is presumably also the self that thinks ‘The proof is valid’. Again, 
they are the same self. In that case, how can this self not conceive of the ‘I’ that thinks ‘The 
proof is valid’ as located and embodied, given that it is aware of the same ‘I’ that thinks ‘This 
is a tree’ as located and embodied?    
This brings out a peculiarity in how Longuenesse argues for the distinctness thesis. This 
thesis is at its most plausible in relation to thoughts about logical objects (such as proofs) and 
at its least plausible in relation to thoughts about ordinary objects of perception (such as trees). 
Consciousness of oneself as the subject of thinking is not consciousness of oneself as any kind 
of object in the case of thinking that is not tied to perception. Consciousness of thinking that is 
tied to perception does require consciousness of the subject of thinking as some kind of object 
– a corporeal object. In arguing for the distinctness thesis Longuenesse shifts from one case to 
the other and draws attention to the minimal and austere conception of the thinking self that is 
required to sustain purely abstract thinking about logical objects. However, much our thinking 
is not purely abstract and is sustained by perception, as in the case of perceptual-demonstrative 
thinking. The thinking self that can supposedly manage without any awareness of itself as 
embodied is also a perceiving self, and the perceiving self must be aware of itself as embodied. 
The ‘thinking self’ and the ‘perceiving self’ are one and the same self and that self is aware of 
itself as a bodily self.  
Longuenesse agrees that consciousness of oneself as thinking is intimately connected 
to awareness of one’s own body. According to the connection thesis, this is a matter of 
empirical fact rather than a priori argument but it’s difficult to understand how this can be so. 
Consider this argument which Longuenesse takes from Kant’s critique of rational psychology 
in the Third Paralogism: 
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[T]he only way we are objectively justified in believing ourselves to be entities that 
persist through time, and the only way we are able to track our own existence through 
time, is by adopting a third-person standpoint on our own existence as the existence of 
an embodied entity. We cannot derive any objectively justified belief in our persisting 
existence from our mere consciousness of ourselves in thinking. In other words, Kant’s 
argument, as I understand it, is a strong defense of the distinction, but also the intimate 
connection, between consciousness of oneself in thinking and consciousness of oneself 
as an embodied entity (2017: 234). 
There is nothing particularly empirical about this argument. It isn’t an empirical thesis that our 
mere consciousness of ourselves in thinking can’t justify the belief in our persisting existence. 
The considerations in support of the claim that consciousness of ourselves as embodied entities 
is what is needed to justify such a belief are a priori rather than empirical. But why does 
consciousness of oneself in thinking require the justified belief that one is an entity that 
persists? Because thinking takes time. In running through the steps of a complex proof the 
identity of the self that entertains the premises with the self that draws the conclusion is 
presupposed. If the time at which the conclusion is drawn is later than the time at which the 
premises are entertained it follows that the self that conceives of itself as drawing a conclusion 
from previously entertained premises must implicitly be conceiving of itself as a persisting self. 
So if the conception of oneself as persisting requires consciousness of oneself as a bodily entity 
then the consciousness of oneself in thinking requires, at least implicitly, the consciousness of 
oneself as a bodily entity.  
What is striking about this argument is not just that it establishes what looks like an a 
priori connection between consciousness of oneself as thinking and consciousness of oneself 
as an embodied entity but also that it applies to consciousness of thinking generally, and not 
just consciousness of thinking about objects of perception. A competent I-thinker will think of 
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himself or herself as persisting, at least for some time, rather than as a momentary existent. By 
Longuenesse’s lights, such a thinker will also be conscious of himself or herself as an embodied 
entity and, in this sense, ‘as an object’. The significance of this can be brought out by turning 
to the Preface and Acknowledgments of I, Me, Mine, where Longuenesse represents her book 
as written partly in response to my 1997 book Self and World. In that book I argued that 
awareness of oneself ‘qua subject’ and ‘as an object’ are compatible. Following Merleau-Ponty 
I argued that in being aware of oneself as a bodily self, one is aware of oneself as a ‘subject-
object’, that is, as both a subject of thinking and experience and as a corporeal object among 
corporeal objects. 
In a paper published in 2006 Longuenesse defended the view that ‘consciousness of 
oneself as the subject of thought is not and cannot be consciousness of oneself as an object’ 
(2006: 284). In I, Me, Mine she continues to insist, following Kant, that there is a ‘fundamental 
difference between the self-consciousness proper to the thinking subject in the course of her 
thinking, and her consciousness of herself as an object in the world’ (2017: xii). In the light of 
this, what is the significance of allowing that the consciousness of oneself in thinking requires 
the consciousness of oneself as a bodily entity? There remains this crucial difference between 
Longuenesse’s view and mine: on my view, as Longuenesse accurately represents it, it is 
possible for there to be a single state of awareness that is both awareness of oneself qua subject 
of thought and experience and awareness of oneself as a physical object among physical 
objects. For Longuenesse, this ‘single state’ view is incoherent: awareness of something qua 
subject is incompatible with that same awareness counting as awareness of that same self as an 
object. The most that her position allows is a view according to which the relation between 




It’s not clear, though, that the latter ‘conjunctive’ view is preferable to the single state 
view. For it has emerged, on the one hand, that the self-consciousness proper to the thinking 
subject in the course of her thinking effectively incorporates awareness of the thinking self as 
persisting and as spatially related to the objects of perceptual-demonstrative thinking. On the 
other hand, the latter forms of awareness are inseparable from consciousness of oneself as an 
embodied entity. Consciousness of oneself qua thinking subject incorporates consciousness of 
oneself as an embodied entity. It isn’t just that these forms of awareness are simultaneous or 
somehow run in parallel. They are, at a fundamental level, different aspects of one and the same 
state or episode of consciousness.                
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